> For the complete documentation index, see [llms.txt](https://documentation.justbeep.it/llms.txt). Markdown versions of documentation pages are available by appending `.md` to page URLs; this page is available as [Markdown](https://documentation.justbeep.it/product-overview/riffs/security.md).

# Security

Riffs is audited by Quantstamp, and its design keeps each user's money isolated.

* **Audit.** Quantstamp has audited Riffs.
* **No pooled funds.** Per-user and per-riff wallets keep any failure contained to one riff.
* **MPC keys.** Privy's MPC means no single party, including Beep, holds a full private key.
* **Scoped agent signing.** The agent's signer works only inside wallet policies, and withdrawals go only to addresses the user owns.
* **Prompt-injection defense.** News, posts and X tags are untrusted input. They can inform a signal, but they can't change limits, venues or where money goes.

## What if the agent goes rogue?

The agent can't steal funds or send them to an attacker. It decides what to trade, but it never decides where money can go. Every transaction it signs is checked against wallet policies it cannot change, and only the user can withdraw.

| If the agent, or someone controlling it, tries to... | What stops it                                                                                                             | Enforced by                     |
| ---------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------- |
| Send funds to an outside wallet                      | Withdrawals can only go to the user's own wallet or linked account. The agent's signer has no permission to transfer out. | Privy wallet policy, at signing |
| Trade on a fake venue or a malicious token contract  | Only allowlisted venues and contracts can be signed. Anything else is refused.                                            | Privy wallet policy, at signing |
| Drain a riff through bad trades                      | Order size, leverage and per-name caps, a liquidity filter, and the user's stop-loss limit how much any trade can lose.   | Policy checks and wallet policy |
| Change its own limits or the withdrawal address      | Limits and payout addresses can be changed only with the user's approval.                                                 | User approval                   |
| Act on a planted instruction in news or an X post    | Outside text is treated as data. It can shape a signal, but it can't change limits, venues or destinations.               | Agent runtime guardrails        |
| Use a breach of Beep's servers                       | MPC means no single party holds a full key, and the agent's signer stays scoped by policy.                                | Privy MPC                       |
| Spread from one riff to others                       | Each riff has its own funding wallet, and nothing is pooled.                                                              | Wallet isolation                |

The user can revoke the agent and withdraw at any time from the app.
